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2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
4	SAN JOSE DIVISION
5	SANTA CLARA VALLEY) CV-08-5097-JF
6	SANTA CLARA VALLEY) CV-08-5097-JF HOUSING GROUP, INC., ET) AL,) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA
7	PLAINTIFF,)
8) JULY 19, 2011 VS.
9)
10	UNITED STATES,) PAGES 1-35
11	DEFENDANT.
12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JEREMY FOGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14	
15	APPEARANCES:
16	
17	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: HOCHMAN SALKIN BY: STEVEN TOSCHER
18	LACEY STRACHAN SHARYN FISK
19	9150 WILSHIRE BLVD, STE 300 BEVERLY HILLS, CA 90212
20	BEVEREI HIELS, OH 30212
21	FOR THE DEFENDANT: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TAX DIVISION
22	BY: HENRY C. DARMSTADTER, III JAMES WEAVER
23	PO BOX 683 WASHINGTON, DC 20044
24	WASHINGION, DC 20044
25	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: SUMMER FISHER, CSR, CRR CERTIFICATE NUMBER 13185

1	SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA JULY 19, 2011
2	PROCEEDINGS
3	(WHEREUPON, COURT CONVENED AND THE
4	FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD:)
5	THE COURT: SANTA CLARA VALLEY HOUSING,
6	GROUP.
7	THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON. PLEASE BE
8	SEATED AND COME TO ORDER.
9	THIS IS THE MATTER OF SANTA CLARA VALLEY
10	HOUSING VERSUS THE UNITED STATES.
11	MAY I HAVE COUNSEL'S APPEARANCES, PLEASE.
12	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: HENRY DARMSTADTER
13	AND JAMES WEAVER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT,
14	YOUR HONOR.
15	MR. TOSCHER: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.
16	STEVEN TOSCHER, SHARYN FISK AND LACEY
17	STRACHAN FOR PLAINTIFFS KRISTEN BOWES AND SANTA
18	CLARA VALLEY HOUSING GROUP.
19	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
20	WELL, THANK YOU FOR YOUR BRIEFS. THEY
21	WERE VERY, VERY HELPFUL.
22	I HAVE A QUESTION I WOULD LIKE TO START
23	WITH JUST TO FOCUS THINGS A LITTLE BIT.
24	THE GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING AN ADJUDICATION
25	THAT THE S CORPORATION WAS NEVER PROPERLY

- CONSTITUTED. SO IF THAT WERE THE CASE THEN THE
 CORPORATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAXED AS A C
 CORPORATION.
- I'M TRYING TO GET A SENSE OF THE BIG

 PICTURE. MS. BOWES'S MOTION, WHICH IS FOR REFUND,

 HER PIECE OF THE REFUND, RATHER HER LIABILITY, IS A

 PIECE OF THE LIABILITY OF THE C CORPORATION IS

 FAIRLY MINIMAL.

- SO I JUST WANT TO GET A SENSE OF HOW THIS
 PLAYS OUT. IF THE GOVERNMENT IS SUCCESSFUL ON ITS
 MOTION, WHAT'S LEFT TO DO IN THE CASE AS A WHOLE?
- MR. DARMSTADTER, III: YOUR HONOR, IF -BEFORE THE COURT IS ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES. IF THE
 COURT DETERMINES THAT SANTA CLARA WAS A C
 CORPORATION THEN IT WOULD BE TAXED AS A C
 CORPORATION AND THERE WOULDN'T BE A NEED IT
 REALLOCATE THE INCOME FROM THE PENSION PLAN TO THE
 OTHER SHAREHOLDERS.
- THERE WAS SIMPLY THE PENALTY ASPECT OF
 THE CASE, BUT THAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT AS IT
 PERTAINS TO TAXING THE INCOME.
- IN OTHER WORDS, IT WOULD BE INSTEAD OF S

 CORPORATION TAXATION WHICH PASSES THROUGH TO THE

 INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS, IT WOULD BE A C

 CORPORATION WHERE IT'S TAXED FIRST AT THE ENTITY

1	LEVEL THEN POTENTIALLY A SECOND TIME WHEN IT'S
2	THE COURT: RIGHT. NO, I UNDERSTAND.
3	BUT I'M JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE
4	ACCOUNTING PLAYS OUT.
5	THE TAXPAYERS IN THIS INSTANCE PAID WHAT
6	THEY WERE REQUIRED TO PAY AND NOW THEY ARE ASKING
7	FOR THAT MONEY BACK.
8	SO IF YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING ME
9	THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN S CORPORATION, JUST EXPLAIN
10	TO ME HOW THE DOLLARS FLOW AND WHAT REMAINS FOR THE
11	COURT.
12	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: CERTAINLY,
13	YOUR HONOR.
14	IN THAT CASE, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD MS. BOWES
15	WOULD BE ENTITLED TO A REFUND.
16	THE COURT: OF ABOUT \$8,000 OR SOMETHING?
17	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: I BELIEVE IT'S
18	MORE THAN THAT.
19	THE COURT: MORE THAN THAT, OKAY.
20	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: BUT THAT'S
21	CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.
22	WE WOULD TAX IT AS A C CORPORATION AND IT
23	WOULDN'T PASS THROUGH TO MS. BOWES AS AN S
24	CORPORATION TAX, SO SHE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO A
25	REFUND IN A CERTAIN AMOUNT THAT I BELIEVE

1 MR. TOSCHER AND I COULD AGREE TO THAT FIGURE. 2 THE COURT: BUT THEN WHAT HAPPENS TO THE 3 TAX LIABILITY? DO YOU COLLECT MONEY FROM THE --4 AGAIN, I'M JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE FIGHT 5 IS ULTIMATELY ABOUT. 6 SO HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT GET MADE 7 WHOLE? HOW DOES MS. BOWES GET MADE WHOLE? WHERE 8 DOES THAT LEAVE US IF THERE WAS NEVER AN S 9 CORPORATION? 10 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: IF THERE WAS NEVER 11 AN S CORPORATION, YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD TAX SANTA CLARA AS A C CORPORATION. AND THAT WOULD BE, 12 13 BECAUSE PRESUMABLY I BELIEVE THEY FILED CLAIMS FOR REFUND, THAT ALL OF THE INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS, 14 15 MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY, WOULD BE ENTITLED TO A 16 PARTIAL REFUND. THE COURT: OKAY. BUT THEN HOW DOES 17 18 LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION GET PAID? 19 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THE LIABILITY OF 20 THE CORPORATION WOULD BE PAID THROUGH THE ASSETS OF 21 SANTA CLARA. 22 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO. 23 I'M ASKING -- I THINK ULTIMATELY IT'S A 24 PRETTY SIMPLE QUESTION BUT I JUST NEED TO

UNDERSTAND IT BECAUSE I WANT TO UNDERSTAND THE BIG

1 PICTURE AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 2 SO AT THAT POINT SANTA CLARA WOULD OWE 3 MONEY TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT'S NOT YET PAID? MR. DARMSTADTER, III: TO THE EXTENT THEY 4 5 MAY HAVE BEEN PAID, A GOOD PORTION OF THE MONEY IN 6 ORDER TO FILE THEIR REFUNDS. 7 APPARENTLY THERE ARE OTHER YEARS FOR 8 WHICH THEY HAVE NOT PAID AND THEY WOULD OWE THAT 9 MONEY. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 10 11 SO THERE WOULD STILL BE AN OUTSTANDING 12 COLLECTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK AGAINST 13 SANTA CLARA BUT THE INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS, THE FAMILY MEMBERS, WOULD ALL BE ENTITLED TO SOME SUM 14 15 OF MONEY BACK. 16 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THAT'S CORRECT, 17 YOUR HONOR. WE WOULD TAX ALL OF THE YEARS FOR THIS 18 STRATEGY AS A C CORPORATION. 19 20 AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL 21 SHAREHOLDERS PAY TAX ON THAT MONEY, THEN THEY WOULD 22 BE ENTITLED TO A REFUND. 23 THE COURT: OKAY. 24 SO THERE WOULD BE SOME RE ACCOUNTING THAT

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WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE.

1	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: AND YOUR HONOR,
2	SORRY TO INTERRUPT, BUT PLEASE DON'T FEEL THAT THE
3	COURT NEEDS TO CALCULATE THAT AMOUNT. WE WOULD
4	THE COURT: I DON'T.
5	I JUST WANT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE FIGHT
6	IS ABOUT BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT, IF I'M
7	UNDERSTANDING THE PAPERS CORRECTLY, IS NOT SEEKING
8	SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS AN ABUSE
9	OF TAX SHELTER. THAT'S AN ISSUE THAT MS. BOWES HAS
10	RAISED BUT IT'S NOT AN ISSUE THE GOVERNMENT HAS
11	RAISED.
12	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: WE HAVE MOVED FOR
13	SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON THE KIND OF TECHNICAL TAX
14	ISSUE WHICH IS THIS SECOND CLASS OF STOCK
15	THE COURT: RIGHT.
16	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: ISSUE, BY
17	REASON OF THE WARRANTS.
18	THE COURT: OKAY. I WILL COME BACK TO
19	THAT. I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE NOW THAT SANTA
20	CLARA DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD OR SUBTRACT OF
21	WHAT I JUST SAID ABOUT WHAT THE FIGHT IS ABOUT.
22	MR. TOSCHER: I THINK THAT'S CORRECT,
23	YOUR HONOR.
24	IF IT WAS A C CORPORATION MS. BOWES WOULD

BE ENTITLED TO ALL THE AMOUNTS SHE SOUGHT IN THE

1 COMPLAINT. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS ARE MUTUALLY 2 3 EXCLUSIVE. THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 4 5 SO LET'S TALK ABOUT THE, WHAT KIND OF 6 CORPORATION THIS WAS. AND THERE'S TWO PRONGS TO THE ARGUMENT. ONE IS THAT THERE WERE TWO CLASSES OF 8 9 STOCK. AND THE OTHER IS SO THAT THERE COULDN'T 10 HAVE BEEN AN S CORPORATION. 11 AND SECONDLY, THAT THE WARRANTS 12 NECESSARILY WERE GOING TO BE EXERCISED, WHICH IS 13 ANOTHER EXCEPTION AND A NARROWER ONE. AND AS I UNDERSTAND SANTA CLARA'S 14 15 POSITION, YOU'RE ESSENTIALLY ARGUING THAT -- THAT 16 BOTH OF THOSE REQUIREMENTS HAVE TO BE MET. THERE 17 HAVE TO BE TWO CLASSES OF STOCK AND THAT THE 18 WARRANTS HAVE TO BE NECESSARILY EXERCISED, CORRECT? 19 THAT'S YOUR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION? 20 MR. TOSCHER: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 21 UNDER THE REGULATION IN ORDER FOR THE S 22 CORPORATION, SANTA CLARA, TO BE DISQUALIFIED UPON 23 THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANTS, TWO REQUIREMENTS. 24 ONE, YOU MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN 25 THAT WARRANT WAS GOING TO BE EXERCISED. AND TWO,

1 IT MUST BE -- IT MUST HAVE BEEN ISSUED AT THE PRICE
2 SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN THE VALUE -3 THE COURT: I'M SORRY, I DIDN'T ASK MY

QUESTION VERY WELL.

- THERE'S SUBSECTION II AND SUBSECTION III.

 AND AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

 ARGUMENT, YOU ARE SAYING THAT III IS A REFINEMENT

 OF II.
 - IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S NOT ENOUGH THAT

 THERE BE TWO CLASSES OF STOCK OR SECURITY, THERE

 ALSO HAS TO BE A PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC OF THE

 WARRANT IN THIS CASE.
- MR. TOSCHER: YOUR HONOR, THAT'S CORRECT.

 IN TALKING ABOUT (II) WHICH IS A

 THRESHOLD ISSUE, WHETHER IT EVEN APPLIES TO

 WARRANTS.
 - WE DON'T THINK IT DOES, (II) BY

 CONSTRUCTION OF THE REGULATION, I COULD POINT OUT

 NUMEROUS EXAMPLES POINTED TO DEBT, EQUITY TYPE

 ISSUES, NOT TO WHETHER A WARRANT IS A SECOND CLASS

 OF STOCK. THAT HAS ITS OWN REGULATION, AND THAT'S

 (III).
 - THE COURT: SO (II) YOUR VIEW IS THE

 GOVERNMENT CANNOT RELY UPON THAT FOR ANYTHING, THAT

 SINCE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WARRANTS, THEY COULD

ONLY RELY ON (III). (III), IS THE EXCLUSIVE 1 2 TREATMENT OF WARRANTS IN THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE 3 AND THAT THE WARRANTS HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN TO BE EXERCISED, CORRECT? 4 5 MR. TOSCHER: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 6 THE COURT: AND THE POSITION BEING TAKEN 7 BY THE GOVERNMENT IS THESE PROVISIONS ARE SEPARATE 8 THINGS, IT'S SOMETHING TO OUALIFY A WARRANT AND 9 QUALIFY UNDER (II) WITHOUT QUALIFYING UNDER (III). 10 MR. TOSCHER: THAT'S THE POSITION, 11 YOUR HONOR. 12 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 13 ANYTHING ON THAT? I JUST WANTED TO 14 DEFINE THE ISSUE. 15 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: YES, YOUR HONOR. 16 I THINK THAT PRETTY MUCH DOES DEFINE THE 17 ISSUE. 18 WE FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT (II) DOES 19 APPLY TO THE INSTRUMENTS THAT WERE ISSUED IN THIS 20 CASE. THERE WAS NO OTHER PURPOSE FOR THESE 21 INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN TO SEPARATE THE EQUITY FROM 22 THE --23 THE COURT: RIGHT. BUT WE ARE TALKING 24 ABOUT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, BECAUSE THE ONLY 25 REFERENCE TO WARRANTS IS IN (III), CORRECT?

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: WELL, THE ONLY --1 THE COURT: THE WORD "WARRANTS" IS ONLY 2 3 USED THERE. MR. DARMSTADTER, III: IT'S ONLY USED 4 5 THERE, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THESE WERE WARRANTS 6 REALLY ONLY IN FORM AND NOT IN SUBSTANCE. 7 THE COURT: RIGHT. NO, I UNDERSTAND YOUR 8 ARGUMENT. 9 YOU ARE SAYING THE COURT SHOULDN'T GET 10 TOO BOTHERED BY THAT, THAT WHAT THE COURT SHOULD 11 LOOK AT IS THE REALITY OF THE INTEREST THAT WAS 12 CREATED AND DECIDE WHICH OF THESE SECTION IT FALLS 13 UNDER. MR. DARMSTADTER, III: AND (II) IS ABOUT 14 15 AS BROAD AS IT COULD BE IN TERMS OF TRYING COVER 16 ANY INSTRUMENT. IT'S KIND OF A REGULATOR'S CRY TO, 17 HEY, THIS IS WHAT WE WANT TO PREVENT. AND WE THINK 18 THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT 19 KPMG DID IN DESIGNING THESE WARRANTS SO THEY WOULD 20 PAY THE TAX SHELL GAME. 21 THE COURT: WELL, I HAVE QUESTIONS FOR 22 BOTH OF YOU AND YOU CAN BOTH BE SEATED IF YOU LIKE. 23 I HAVE SPECIFIC OUESTIONS THAT GO TO THIS 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ISSUE.

AND THE QUESTION I HAVE FOR THE

GOVERNMENT IS, IT SEEMS TO ME WHAT THE FAMILY WAS
LOOKING FOR HERE IS A SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULDN'T
HAVE TO EXERCISE THE WARRANTS.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE WARRANTS WERE THEIR SECURITY IN THE EVENT THAT SOMETHING WENT AWRY WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY.

NOT ONLY IS THERE NO CERTAINTY OR

SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY THAT THE WARRANTS WOULD BE

EXERCISED, BUT THE WHOLE IDEA IS THEY WOULD NEVER

BE EXERCISED.

IS THERE SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE VIEW?
BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT'S WHAT THE FACTS ARE.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: YOUR HONOR, THAT APPLIES TO (III), THE SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY.

AND I HOPE WE WERE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATE JUST HOW IN THE MONEY, TO USE A TERM OF ART, THESE WARRANTS ARE.

IN OTHER WORDS, HOW MUCH FREE MONEY
ESSENTIALLY THE EXERCISER OF WARRANTS WOULD GET
UPON THEIR EXERCISE.

WE BELIEVE THAT KPMG SPECIFICALLY GAINED
THE SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY PART OF THE REGULATION,
THE TEST REQUIRES THAT YOU CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ONE IS HOW DEEPLY THEY ARE
IN THE MONEY.

1 IT'S LIKE LEAVING, YOU KNOW, A \$50 BILL
2 ON THE GROUND, ULTIMATELY SOMEBODY IS GOING TO PICK
3 IT UP. AND THERE'S AN ECONOMIC COMPULSION, WE
4 BELIEVE, FROM THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD THAT IF YOU
5 CAN INSTANTLY GET MONEY THROUGH EXERCISE OF THE
6 WARRANTS, THAT YOU WOULD GO AHEAD AND DO IT.
7 THE COURT: WELL, LET ME SEE IF I'M

THE COURT: WELL, LET ME SEE IF I'M
HEARING YOU CORRECTLY BECAUSE THIS IS PRETTY
TECHNICAL.

THE WHOLE DESIGN WAS THAT THEY WOULDN'T

EVER HAVE TO ACTUALLY EXERCISE THE WARRANTS BECAUSE

THE WARRANTS WOULD BE SO VALUABLE THAT THEY WOULD

GET THEIR INTEREST BACK WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTS

WERE EXERCISED. THERE WOULD BE NO REASON FOR THE

VOTING SHARES NOT TO REINSTATE THE MONEY INVESTED.

BECAUSE THE EFFECT OF NOT DOING SO WOULD BE

UNTENABLE.

SO THEREFORE, JUST THE MERE THREAT THAT THE WARRANTS COULD BE EXERCISED WAS ENOUGH.

IS THAT YOUR THEORY?

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: AS PART OF THE S,
C SQUARED ARRANGEMENT THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING
THAT THE WARRANTS WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN
TERMS OF THE VALUATION OF WHAT WAS TRANSFERRED TO
THE PENSION PLAN.

AND WHEN THEY WENT TO APPRAISE THE VALUE

OF THE STOCK THAT WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE PENSION

PLAN, BOTH AT THE TIME OF DONATION, AT THE TIME OF

REDEMPTION, THEY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT AS IF THE

WARRANTS WERE EXERCISED --

THE COURT: RIGHT.

SARAH FRAZER, I MEAN, SHE WAS VERY CLEAR
ABOUT IT, SHE WAS A HUNDRED PERCENT CERTAIN THESE
WARRANTS WOULD BE EXERCISED BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD
BE TO BASICALLY THROW AWAY MONEY.

SO WE THINK THAT THE PROPER WAY TO VIEW
THAT IS AS A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, ARE
THE WARRANTS DEEP IN THE MONEY, AND IS THERE SOME
STRONGER REASON AS TO WHY SOMEBODY WOULDN'T
EXERCISE THESE WARRANTS?

AND IF THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE INTO

ACCOUNT FOR PURPOSES OF VALUATION, THE WARRANTS, IN

THEIR PURE DILUTED EFFECT WHICH BASICALLY DESTROYS

THE VALUE OF THE SHARES HELD BY THE PENSION PLAN,

THEN WE THINK THAT PART OF THE REQUIREMENT IS

SATISFIED.

IN OTHER WORDS, THEY'VE TRIED TO

CIRCUMVENT THE REGULATION BY SAYING, WELL, IF WE

ALL PRETEND THAT THE WARRANTS ARE GOING TO BE

EXERCISED THEN WE REALLY DON'T HAVE TO EXERCISE.

THE COURT: GOT YOU. 1 2 IN OTHER WORDS, I DON'T HAVE TO SHOOT THE 3 GUN IN ORDER TO PUT THE FEAR OF DEATH IN YOU. AS 4 LONG AS I POINT THE GUN AT YOUR HEAD. 5 IT'S A CRUDE EXAMPLE, BUT THAT'S HOW YOU 6 ARE CHARACTERIZING THESE WARRANTS, CORRECT? 7 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THAT'S HOW WE ARE 8 CHARACTERIZING THE WARRANTS. 9 THEY HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR 10 PURPOSES OF DILUTION. 11 AND YOUR HONOR, THE PURPOSE OF THESE 12 WARRANTS IS -- WAS CLEAR. IT WAS SIMPLY TO 13 MISALLOCATE INCOME FROM, IN ORDER TO --THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR THEORY. 14 15 YOU ARE SAYING THAT THE QUESTION OF 16 WHETHER THE WARRANTS ACTUALLY WOULD BE PHYSICALLY 17 EXERCISED, WHETHER THE FAMILY MEMBERS WOULD SAY 18 HERE WE ARE EXERCISING THE WARRANTS, BECAUSE OF THE WAY THAT THE DEAL WAS CONSTRUCTED, THEY DIDN'T NEED 19 20 TO DO THAT. MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THEY WERE 21 22 EFFECTIVELY EXERCISED. 23 THE COURT: RIGHT. THE FACT THAT THE 24 WARRANTS EXISTED WAS ENOUGH. 25 AND THAT IS YOUR THEORY UNDER (III). AND

- 1 YOUR THEORY UNDER (II) IS THAT EVEN IF YOU DON'T 2 CONSTRUE IT THAT WAY, THIS CLEARLY WAS AN EQUITY 3 INTEREST AND IT WAS COVERED BY (II). MR. DARMSTADTER, III: CORRECT, 4 5 YOUR HONOR. 6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 7 LET ME GET THE RESPONSE FROM SANTA CLARA 8 ON THAT. BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THE GOVERNMENT'S 9 GOT SOME FACTS TO SUPPORT WHAT COUNSEL JUST SAID, 10 SO HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THAT. 11 MR. TOSCHER: YES, YOUR HONOR. 12 ON (III), I THINK THE PRESENCE OF THE 13 WARRANT NEEDS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR 14 VALUATION PURPOSES. BUT THE REGULATION CLEARLY
 - TALKS ABOUT AN EXERCISE OF THE WARRANT NOT THE EXISTENCE OF THE WARRANT.

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AND VALUATION OR CONSIDERING IT FOR VALUATION IS SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. IF YOU LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE OF THE REGULATION, IT SAYS IT WOULD BE EXERCISED, SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN TO BE EXERCISED, NOT THE EXISTENCE OF THE WARRANT.

SO WHILE I THINK THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT REALLY HAS NO SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REGULATION, IT JUST SIMPLY DOESN'T.

THE COURT: SO YOU READ THE REGULATION

1 LITERALLY, THAT MEANS YOU WIN ON THREE, BUT THEN
2 WHY WOULDN'T TWO BE SUFFICIENT TO BE A CATCH ALL?

BECAUSE CLEARLY THESE WARRANTS HAVE

VALUE, THEY AREN'T JUST SOMETHING THAT IS FLOATING

OUT THERE. THE REASON THAT THEY EXIST, IT SEEMS TO

ME FROM THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, IS TO GIVE YOUR

CLIENTS A MEANS FOR RE COOPING THEIR INVESTMENT.

MR. TOSCHER: THEY ARE PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES YOUR HONOR, THAT'S CORRECT.

I GUESS IF ONE READS THE REGULATION, ONE WOULD HAVE TO REALLY CONTORT OR STRETCH (II) TO COME TO ITS APPLICATION. JUST BITE INSTRUCT I, THE REGULATION ITSELF, IT APPLIES TO DEBT LIKE INSTRUMENTS.

THERE ARE TWO REFERENCES IN THE
REGULATION ITSELF BOTH UNDER, I THINK, (I) AND
LITTLE FOUR, ROMAN NUMERAL, WHICH BY ITS STRUCTURE
MAKE CLEAR THAT IT DOESN'T APPLY TO WARRANTS.

LITTLE (I) SAYS, "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES

WILL (II) APPLY IF THE SAFE HARBOR IS MET." HOW

COULD THERE BE A SAFE HARBOR FOR WARRANTS

STRUCTURED IF (II) COULD OVERRULE THAT?

THE COURT: WHAT COUNSEL IS SAYING IS

THESE ARE WARRANTS IN NAME ONLY. HE'S SAYING YOU

HAVE TO LOOK THROUGH THE FORM AND LOOK THROUGH THE

SUBSTANCE OF WHAT'S BEING DONE.

AND THE GOVERNMENT IS SAYING THESE

CLEARLY ARE, THEY AREN'T JUST PROPHYLACTIC, THEY

ARE EQUITY INTERESTS THAT DON'T HAVE TO BE ASSERTED

BECAUSE OF THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EXISTED AT THE

TIME THEY WERE CREATED BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD BE

ASSERTED AND THEY WOULD GET BACK ALL THE MONEY THEY

PUT IN.

MR. TOSCHER: AND I THINK THAT'S THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAW IN THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, YOUR HONOR, IS ALL WARRANTS HAVING EQUITY COMPONENT.

IT'S AN OPTION TO BUY ON THE UP SIDE.

THEY CLEARLY HAVE AN EQUITY COMPONENT. BUT THE TAX

LAW FOR MANY YEARS HAS DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN A

WARRANT WHICH DOES HAVE AN EQUITY COMPONENT AND

STOCK OWNERSHIP. THOSE ARE TWO SEPARATE ISSUES.

THAT ISSUE WAS JOINED WHEN THEY FIRST

PROMULGATED THIS REGULATION. AND THEY FINALLY CAME

OUT WITH THE COMPROMISE OR DEVELOPMENT OF THIS

REGULATION WHICH SAID WE WOULD ALLOW WARRANTS FOR S

CORPORATIONS EVEN THOUGH WE COULD STORE EQUITY

VALUE, PROVIDED YOU MEET THESE TWO REQUIREMENTS OR

DON'T -- THAT DON'T FALL AFOUL OF THESE TWO OR YOU

CAN COMPLY WITH THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION.

THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 1 2 SO TELL ME WHY UNDER THE FACTS THAT ARE 3 PRESENTED HERE IN THE ARGUMENT WE'VE JUST BEEN 4 ENGAGING IN, THAT YOUR CLIENT IS ENTITLED TO 5 SUMMARY JUDGEMENT THAT THIS WAS ALL ABOVE BOARD AND 6 FINE AND THERE'S NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS AN ABUSIVE PRACTICE. 8 MR. TOSCHER: OKAY. 9 LET ME START WITH THE SECOND CLASS OF 10 STOCK ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, WHY WE ARE ENTITLED. 11 I THINK BASED UPON ALL THE FACTS, THE 12 UNDISPUTED FACTS, IT WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN 13 THAT THESE WARRANTS WOULD BE EXERCISED. AND IF THE COURT COULD FIND THERE'S NO 14 15 FACTUAL DISPUTE ON THAT, WE ARE ENTITLED TO 16 JUDGMENT UNDER WHAT WE BELIEVE IS THE CORRECT 17 INTERPRETATION. 18 THE COURT: ON THIS C CORP VERSUS S CORP? 19 MR. TOSCHER: YOUR HONOR, I WANT TO PUT 20 THAT ASIDE AND NOW I'M HAPPY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE. 21 PLAINTIFF BOWES, IN RESPONDING TO, WELL 22 THE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSERTED IF IT IS AN S 23 CORPORATION THAT THE ALLOCATION OF INCOME SHOULD NOT BE ALLOCATED 90 10. 24

WE START FROM THE PREMISE, AND THIS IS A

1 VERY CAREFULLY DEVELOPED TAX STRUCTURE, THAT INCOME 2 IN AN S CORPORATION IS ALLOCATED BASED UPON SHARE 3 OWNERSHIP. ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. YOU CAN'T CONSIDER DIFFERENT VALUATIONS OF INTERESTS. IT'S ATTEMPTED 4 5 TO BE STRAIGHTFORWARD BASED UPON SHARE OWNERSHIP. 6 WE COULD STOP RIGHT THERE. BUT THE 7 GOVERNMENT SAYS, NO, THEY DON'T REALLY, THEY CAN'T 8 DISPUTE THAT BECAUSE THE STATUTE IS CLEAR, THE 9 SUPREME COURT SAID YOU READ THE STATUTE IN GITLITZ. 10 BUT THE ARGUMENT IS WELL, THE L.A. PLAN WAS REALLY NOT THE OWNER FOR TAX PURPOSES. 11 12 THE COURT: IT WAS A PARKING PLACE. 13 MR. TOSCHER: A PARKING PLACE. AND THAT GETS THE OUESTION OF WHETHER, 14 15 ONE, AND I THINK THERE'S REALLY TWO THEORIES. 16 UNDER, WERE THEY THE BENEFICIAL OWNER, WE DON'T 17 DISAGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE BENEFITS AND 18 BURDEN TEST. 19 OR TWO, I GUESS THE COURT COULD APPLY THE 20 SHAM THEORY, WE DON'T THINK IT APPLIES AND THAT'S 21 WHY WE MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON THE ISSUE 22 BASED UPON THE FACTS. 23 LET ME JUST ADDRESS ONE THING, 24 YOUR HONOR.

THE GOVERNMENT POINTS TO THIS PARKING LOT

- COMMENT. IF ONE READS THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT,

 WHICH, OF THOSE MINUTES OF THE L.A. PENSION PLAN,

 IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THEY VIEW THEMSELVES AS AN
 - IT WAS A FLIPPANT REMARK IN THE SAME

 MEETING THE COMMISSIONER WHO SAID IT TALKED ABOUT

 WHETHER THE PROFITS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ON SANTA

 CLARA MIGHT GET SKIMMED OFF BY THE CITY OF L.A.

 BECAUSE IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THEIR PENSION

 CONTRIBUTION.
 - SO JUST LIKE THERE WAS NO SKIMMING, I
 THINK THAT'S ONE WORD TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND I
 THINK ONE HAS TO EVALUATE, WHAT DID THEY HAVE?

 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.
 - SO WHEN THE SHARES WERE WITH THE PENSION PLAN, DID THOSE SHARES PRODUCE INCOME? WAS THAT MONEY PRODUCTIVE?
 - MR. TOSCHER: YOUR HONOR, DURING THE

 THREE AND A HALF YEARS SANTA CLARA WAS EARNING

 INCOME, WHEN THE MARKET TOOK OFF RIGHT AFTER THE

 DOT COM BUST.
- THE COURT: RIGHT.

OWNER OF THE STOCK.

MR. TOSCHER: AND EARNING A LOT OF

INCOME, BUT THAT INCOME WAS NOT DISTRIBUTED TO

THEM. BUT THE INCOME IN AN S CORPORATION IS

1 ALLOCATED BASED UPON SHARE OWNERSHIP. THE COURT: SO -- BUT WHAT I GUESS WHAT 2 3 I'M GETTING AT -- SO DID THE PENSION PLAN ACTUALLY GET INCOME FROM THE FACT THAT THEY HELD THOSE 4 5 SHARES? MR. TOSCHER: WELL, THERE WERE 6 7 DISTRIBUTIONS, BUT COMPARED TO THE INCOME THEY WERE 8 SMALL DISTRIBUTIONS, BUT THEY DID GET SOME INCOME 9 AND THEY APPRECIATE IT. THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE 10 SUBSTANTIAL APPRECIATION OF THE STOCK FROM THE TIME 11 IT WAS CONTRIBUTED TO THAT, FROM THE TIME IT WAS 12 REDEEMED. 13 THE COURT: RIGHT. BUT THAT'S WHAT I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT. 14 15 WHAT DID THE PENSION PLAN, AND I DON'T 16 MEAN TO BE FLIP HERE, BUT WHAT IS THE RENT THEY GOT 17 FROM THE PARKING PLACE? I MEAN IF YOU --18 MR. TOSCHER: DO I HAVE TO ANSWER THAT? 19 NO, YOUR HONOR. 20 WHAT DID THE PENSION PLAN RECEIVE FROM 2.1 SANTA CLARA? I BELIEVE THERE WERE DIVIDEND 22 DISTRIBUTIONS OF A FEW HUNDRED THOUSAND, 2 TO 23 300,000, I MAY BE OFF THERE. 24 AND ULTIMATELY WHEN THEY TENDERED THE

STOCK FOR REDEMPTION THEY RECEIVED 1.4 OR 56

- 1 MILLION. 2 THE COURT: SO THEY DID RECEIVE VALUE. 3 IT WAS NOT A SHAM TRANSACTION IN THE SENSE THAT 4 THEY GOT NOTHING FOR IT. 5 MR. TOSCHER: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 6 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 7 ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WANT TO SAY BEFORE I 8 GET A RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT? 9 ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. MR. DARMSTADTER, III: YOUR HONOR, IT WAS 10 11 \$200,000 THAT THE PENSION PLAN GOT IN TERMS OF 12 MONEY BEING DISTRIBUTED. AND THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY 13 PART OF THE REDEMPTION AGREEMENT WHEREBY IF THEY AGREED TO HOLD ON TO THE STOCK FOR ANOTHER YEAR 14 15 THEY WOULD GET THAT AMOUNT OF THE PAYMENT. 16 IT HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WHATEVER TO WHAT 17 WAS GOING ON IN SANTA CLARA. 18 THE COURT: IS IT FAIR TO SAY THE WAY YOU 19 SEE THE CASE IS THAT SANTA CLARA NEEDED A PLACE TO 20 PUT THE SHARES SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THEY 2.1 WOULDN'T BE TAXABLE AND THEY PAID A FEE TO THE 22 PENSION FUND WHICH WAS ON THE ORDER OF A COUPLE 23 HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. 24
- 24 IS THAT THE WAY YOU SEE WHAT ACTUALLY
 25 HAPPENED?

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THAT'S EXACTLY HOW
WE SEE WHAT HAPPENED. AND WE PROVIDED THE COURT
WITH A LOT OF, INCLUDING THE MINUTES WHICH ARE VERY
ILLUMINATING, THE MINUTES BETWEEN THE KPMG AND THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE PENSION PLAN.

AND THE COURT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS

IS A DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN, THEY ARE NOT

USED TO RECEIVING GIFTS.

THEM, AND KPMG APPROACHED THEM AND BASICALLY

EXPLAINED THE TRANSACTION THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT THIS

STOCK FOR A PERIOD OF TIME, THAT WE WILL PAY YOU A

MINIMUM PAYMENT, GUARANTEED MINIMUM PAYMENT. AND

THEN AT THE END OF THE TIME PERIOD, WE WILL -- YOU

CAN REDEEM THE STOCK AND MAYBE YOU WILL GET

SOMETHING EXTRA. BUT IT WAS ALWAYS THE ORIGINAL

SHAREHOLDERS.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE REDEMPTION AGREEMENT,
THAT WOULD DECIDE WHAT THAT EXTRA AMOUNT WOULD BE.
AND THAT'S EXACTLY HOW THE L.A. PENSION PLAN
TREATED THESE STOCK CERTIFICATES. THEY DIDN'T
TREAT THEM AS THEY TREAT OTHER ASSETS.

AND HERE WE HAVE A STARK DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN A PENSION PLAN AND ITS OFFICERS WHO HAVE

FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO MANAGE ASSETS AND NEEDS.

1	THEY NEVER PAID ANY HEED TO THEM, THEY
2	NEVER ACTED LIKE AN EQUITY OWNER. THEY HELD THEM
3	FOR ZERO VALUATION. AND WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR
4	REDEMPTION, AT LEAST PRIOR TO THE SENATE CONTACTING
5	THE PENSION PLAN AND TELLING THEM, YOU KNOW
6	THE COURT: THIS IS NOT OKAY.
7	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THIS IS NOT OKAY.
8	THEY BASICALLY KPMG WOULD NOTIFY THEM
9	ITS REDEMPTION TIME AND THEY RETRIEVED THE STOCK
10	THEN THEY WOULD GET THEIR PAYMENT.
11	IT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY APPROACHING AN
12	EQUITY OWNERSHIP INTEREST OR A 90 PERCENT EQUITY
13	OWNERSHIP.
14	THE COURT: THEY NEVER ACTED AS REAL
15	OWNERS, IS YOUR VIEW.
16	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: NO, THEY DIDN'T.
17	AND, YOU KNOW, WE ARE NOT JUST SAYING
18	THAT, YOU KNOW, THEY DIDN'T THEY DIDN'T, YOU
19	KNOW, GO TO SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND ALL OF THAT.
20	THEY DIDN'T ACT IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM
21	AS AN OWNER AS OPPOSED TO THEIR OTHER ASSETS WHICH
22	THEY CAREFULLY MANAGE AND HAD FIDUCIARY
23	RESPONSIBILITIES OVER.
24	THE COURT: SO THE PENSION FUND HAD
25	PEOPLE WHO MANAGE THEIR INVESTMENTS AND WHO DID SO

1 IN AN ACTIVE, HANDS-ON WAY BUT NOT WITH RESPECT TO
2 THESE SHARES.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THIS PENSION PLAN HAD MILLIONS OF DOLLARS UNDER MANAGEMENT AND THEY TREATED THOSE ASSETS COMPLETELY DIFFERENTLY THAN THEY TREATED THIS -- IT WAS TREATED AS A PROGRAM, WHERE ESSENTIALLY THEY WOULD CALENDAR THE DATE OF REDEMPTION, AND KPMG WOULD CALL, THEM UP SOMETIMES THEY WOULD GET THE DIVIDENDS TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF TIME.

THE COURT: SO THIS WAS SORT OF A LOW IMPACT WAY OF GETTING SOME ADDITIONAL FEES.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THAT'S RIGHT.

I MEAN, IN FACT THE SCHOTT ORGANIZATION,

MR. SCHOTT EVEN CHARACTERIZED THE PAYMENTS OF THE

PENSION PLAN AS A FEE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: NOW WITH RESPECT
TO THE WARRANTS, YOUR HONOR, I THOUGHT AT LEAST ONE
OF THE MOST USEFUL THINGS TO KIND OF GO OVER THE
DAMAGE THAT WAS DONE TO THE OUTSTANDING SHARES BY
REASON OF THE CREATION OR THE ISSUANCE OF THESE
WARRANTS JUST TO KIND OF MAKE SURE THAT THAT REALLY
IS CLEAR, AND WE ARE USING PLAINTIFF'S OWN
APPRAISAL OF THAT WHICH IS \$1.7 MILLION. THAT WAS

1 WHAT MESIROW OR WENDY SHARON WHEN SHE APPRAISED
2 SANTA CLARA AT THE TIME OF DONATION.

AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME THERE WERE A
THOUSAND SHARES OF STOCK OUTSTANDING OF WHICH THEY
WERE GOING GIVE 90 OR 900 TO THE PENSION PLAN. AND
EACH SHARE OF STOCK WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTH OVER
\$1,700.

HOWEVER, AFTER THE WARRANTS WERE ISSUED,
THE VALUE OF THOSE OUTSTANDING SHARES WENT FROM
\$1,700 DOWN TO HUNDRED 81 DOLLARS. AND THE ONLY
REASON FOR THAT WAS THE ISSUANCE OF THESE WARRANTS.

THAT I THINK IS A DEMONSTRATIVE WAY TO ESTABLISH HOW MUCH EQUITY WAS LITERALLY TRANSFERRED FROM THE OUTSTANDING STOCK TO THE WARRANTS.

THE COURT: JUST, CAN YOU WALK ME THROUGH
THE ARITHMETIC AGAIN.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: SURE.

THE COURT: BEFORE THE WARRANTS WERE ISSUED SANTA CLARA WAS WORTH 1.7 MILLION.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: AND I SHOULD SAY,
YOUR HONOR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS RETAINED EXPERTS AND
WE BELIEVE THAT SANTA CLARA WAS WORTH \$40 MILLION
OR THERE ABOUT. SO THERE'S A HUGE DISCREPANCY.

THE COURT: BUT WE ARE JUST TALKING ABOUT
BOOK VALUE OF --

1 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: RIGHT. THE COURT: SO AT THAT POINT IT'S WORTH 2 3 1.7 MILLION, AND THERE'S HOW MANY SHARES OF STOCK? 4 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: A THOUSAND SHARES 5 OF STOCK OUTSTANDING. 6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 7 SO THE WARRANTS DILUTE -- YOUR THEORY IS 8 THE WARRANTS DILUTE THE POOL OF EOUITY OWNERSHIP BY 9 ADDING, I FORGET -- I MEAN, I CAN'T IMMEDIATELY DO 10 THE MATH BUT IT'S LIKE A 90 PERCENT, FACTOR OF 11 NINE. 12 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: RIGHT. FACTOR OF 13 NINE. THEY COMPLETELY -- AND THERE HAS BEEN NO 14 15 REAL EXPLANATION, NO BUSINESS PURPOSES TO WHY SANTA 16 CLARA ISSUED WARRANTS. CERTAINLY NO ONE WITHIN SCHOTT ORGANIZATION HAS ANY EXPLANATION OF THE 17 18 ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANTS. IT WAS ALL DONE BY KPMG AS PART OF THE STRATEGY. THERE WAS NO LEGITIMATE 19 20 BUSINESS PURPOSE. AND OF COURSE CORPORATIONS CAN 21 ISSUE WARRANTS, THEY DO TO INCENTIVIZE EMPLOYEES --22 THE COURT: OR EVEN LEGAL TAX SHELTERS, 23 RIGHT? 24 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THAT'S TRUE,

25

YOUR HONOR.

- 1 THERE MAY BE MANY LEGITIMATE REASONS TO 2 ISSUE WARRANTS BUT IN THIS CASE THERE WERE NONE 3 OTHER THAN TO TRANSFER THE EQUITY AND KEEP THAT 4 WITH THE ORIGINAL SHAREHOLDERS WHILE THEY COULD DO 5 THIS BAIT AND SWITCH GAME TO AVOID PAYING ON THE 6 TAXES. 7 THAT'S WHY WE FEEL SO STRONGLY THAT (II) 8 APPLIES. IT'S AN ANTI ABUSE PROVISION THAT 9 SPECIFICALLY SHOULD APPLY WHEN A CORPORATION GOES 10 OUT OF ITS WAY TO CREATE THESE EQUITY-LIKE 11 INSTRUMENTS. 12 THE COURT: RIGHT. NO, I UNDERSTAND THE 13 ARGUMENT ABOUT HOW TO INTERPRET THE STATUTE AND I'M JUST GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE A CALL ON IT. 14 15 SO I THINK I'VE GOT THE GOVERNMENT'S 16 VIEW. ANYTHING FURTHER THAT --
 - MR. TOSCHER: YOUR HONOR, JUST BRIEFLY ON

 THE -- WHETHER THE PLAN WAS AN OWNER, ACTED LIKE AN

 OWNER AND WHETHER SANTA CLARA TREATED THEM AS

 OWNERS.

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- THE GOVERNMENT DISPUTES THAT, BUT I THINK
 WHEN ONE BOILS DOWN TO THE FACTS OF WHAT HAPPENED
 HERE, THEY WERE TREATED AS OWNERS.
- WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING ADVANTAGE
 OF IN THE RHETORIC, IF YOU WILL, IS THE FACT THAT

- 1 THEY ARE NONVOTING SHAREHOLDERS. NONVOTING 2 SHAREHOLDERS DON'T VOTE ON THINGS, THEY DON'T GET 3 ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN MANAGEMENT, THEY NEVER INTENDED TO GET ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN MANAGEMENT. 4 5 THE INVESTMENT OFFICER OF THE L.A. 6 PENSION PLAN, THESE WERE SMALL INVESTMENTS OR SMALL 7 ASSETS OF THE MULTI BILLION DOLLAR PLAN THAT THEY 8 HAD. 9 AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUING WELL, 10 BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T BOOK A VALUE, THAT 162,000 THAT 11 WAS CONTRIBUTED, THEN THEY WEREN'T TREATED AS 12 OWNERS. 13 BUT IF ONE READS THE TRANSCRIPTS BECAUSE THEY DON'T BOOK IT THAT WAY BECAUSE IT'S A GIFT AND 14 15 THEY ARE NOT SURE WHAT'S GOING TO GET REALIZED AT 16 THE END. THE COURT: THEY DIDN'T BUY IT. 17
- 18 MR. TOSCHER: THEY DIDN'T BUY IT.

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- IN FACT, ONE READS MR. LOPEZ'S TESTIMONY

 THAT'S PROBABLY THE DIFFERENCE. THEY DIDN'T BUY IT

 AS A GIFT, THAT'S THE WAY THEY TREAT.
 - AND ADMITTEDLY, I THINK THE GOVERNMENT

 DOES A REASONABLE EFFORT OF CLOUDING THE ISSUE.

 BUT IF ONE LOOKS AT THE PURE FACTS OF A NONVOTING

 SHAREHOLDER, WE SEEM TO HIT ALL THE BELLS AND

1 WHISTLES. 2 AND THE CASES RELIED UPON BY THE 3 GOVERNMENT ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT AND OPPOSITE. 4 FAMILY SITUATIONS WHERE MOM AND DAD ARE BORROWING 5 OUT THE MONEY AND NEVER PAYING IT BACK. 6 SO I THINK THEY ARE THE OWNERS FOR TAX 7 PURPOSES. ON THE WARRANTS, I UNDERSTAND THE 8 9 GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN WITH THE WARRANTS, BUT THIS 10 TRANSACTION WOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN STRUCTURED IF ONE 11 THOUGHT THE WARRANTS ATTEMPTED TO COMPLY. 12 THE COURT: IF THEY RELIED UPON THE 13 LANGUAGE OF THE REGULATION IN STRUCTURING IT. MR. TOSCHER: THE SUPREME COURT RECENTLY 14 15 IN MAYO SAID WHEN THE IRS ISSUES A REGULATION, LIKE 16 CHEVRON IT'S EFFECTIVELY THE LAW. 17 THE COURT: INTERESTING YOU BRING CHEVRON UP BECAUSE DOESN'T THE IRS'S CURRENT VIEW OF THIS 18 19 TYPE OF TRANSACTION TAKE THE POSITION THAT IT'S 20 IMPROPER? 21 MR. TOSCHER: OKAY. THAT'S A WONDERFUL 22 OUESTION. THERE'S A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN. 23 THE COURT: THEN AND NOW. 24 MR. TOSCHER: TREASURY REGULATION AND THE 25 IRS'S VIEW, THE IRS'S LITIGATION OF ITS FINE

1 LAWYERS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 2 I THINK WHAT THE SUPREME COURT WAS 3 GETTING AT IS IF YOU GO THROUGH THE REGULATORY 4 PROCEDURE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT IN 5 AREAS WHICH CONGRESS CAN'T MICRO MANAGE, YOU HAVE 6 TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR. 7 THAT DOESN'T GO DOWN TO BRIEFS IN COURT, 8 RULINGS OR NOTICES. 9 THE COURT: NO, OF COURSE NOT. 10 YOU ARE SAYING THERES ISN'T ANYTHING 11 THAT'S ENTITLED TO THE CHEVRON DEFERENCE WITH 12 REGARD TO THESE PARTICULAR DECLARATIONS 13 MR. TOSCHER: THE REGULATIONS ARE AND THE REGULATIONS CLEARLY SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF'S 14 15 POSITIONS IN THIS CASE. 16 THE COURT: THE WORDS OF THE REGULATIONS. 17 MR. TOSCHER: THAT'S CORRECT. 18 THE COURT: BUT THERE ISN'T ANY INTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATIONS TO WHICH THIS 19 COURT NEEDS TO DEFER, OR THERE HASN'T BEEN ANOTHER 20 21 CASE LIKE THIS. THERE ISN'T A SITUATION WHERE 22 LOOKING AT THE WORLD AS IT EXISTED IN THE YEAR 2000 23 WE COULD GET ANY DIRECTION.

MR. TOSCHER: YOU ARE CORRECT,

YOUR HONOR. YOU ARE WRITING ON A CLEAN SLATE.

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1 THE COURT: THANK YOU. THE BRIEFS WERE GREAT. I THINK I'VE GOT 2 3 ENOUGH TO WORK WITH. ANYTHING ELSE ANYONE WANTS TO SAY BEFORE 4 5 WE WRAP UP? MR. DARMSTADTER, III: YOUR HONOR, JUST 6 7 ON THAT FINAL POINT, AND I'M SOMEWHAT SYMPATHETIC 8 TO MR. TOSCHER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT COMES 9 IN HERE AND SAYS, YOUR HONOR, INTERPRET THE 10 REGULATIONS --11 THE COURT: YOU CAN'T BE THE REGULATOR 12 AND THE PROSECUTOR. 13 MR. DARMSTADTER, III: WE CAN'T. AND WHAT I WOULD SAY TO THAT IS WE WOULD 14 15 ASK THE COURT TO INTERPRET THE REGULATION IN A WAY 16 THAT WOULD GIVE MEANING TO ITS PURPOSE IS TO 17 PREVENT A TRANSFER OF EQUITY, THESE IN THE MONEY 18 WARRANTS. 19 AND -- SO LET ME JUST FINISH OFF WITH 20 THAT THEN, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT: I THINK IT'S VERY WELL JOINED 21 22 AND I WILL TAKE MY TIME. 23 IT WILL PROBABLY BE A MONTH OR SO BUT I 24 WILL GET A RULING TO YOU SOON.

MR. DARMSTADTER, III: AND WE APPRECIATE

1	THE COURT TAKING UP OUR TASK
2	THE COURT: I WOULDN'T HAVE WANTED TO DO
3	THIS ON MY FRIDAY CALENDAR.
4	AND GENERALLY WHEN I SEE A TAX CASE
5	COMING I RUN THE OTHER WAY, BUT THIS ONE IS
6	ACTUALLY VERY INTERESTING.
7	MR. DARMSTADTER, III: THANK YOU,
8	YOUR HONOR.
9	MR. TOSCHER: THANK YOU VERY MUCH,
10	YOUR HONOR.
11	(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
12	MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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4	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
5	
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7	
8	I, THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICIAL COURT
9	REPORTER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
10	THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 280 SOUTH
11	FIRST STREET, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, DO HEREBY
12	CERTIFY:
13	THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT,
14	CERTIFICATE INCLUSIVE, CONSTITUTES A TRUE, FULL AND
15	CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF MY SHORTHAND NOTES TAKEN AS
16	SUCH OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS
17	HEREINBEFORE ENTITLED AND REDUCED BY COMPUTER-AIDED
18	TRANSCRIPTION TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.
19	
20	
21	
22	SUMMER A. FISHER, CSR, CRR
23	CERTIFICATE NUMBER 13185
24	
25	